Now we come to the background to the debates that took place between Palamas and his three theological opponents. So we're going to examine a theme that has a wider context and in so doing we're going to look at what the case was in the Middle Ages in the West and how that goes back to Greek philosophy. And then how St Gregory dealt with this question vis-a-vis his third theological opponent in particular, Nicephorus Gregoras, who really was the greatest philosopher of his times. Sometimes a little bit of philosophy helps to understand the non-Orthodox doctrines. Don't be alarmed. This is designed to give you an intro to the question of “universals”, Nominalism, Realism, Plato, Aristotle. It's not the final word; it’s just a few pointers so that, when you read something like Romanides' critique of Meyendorff, you're not completely lost. You have some kind of reference point. So the question of “universals” to begin with, which has to do, as I said, with the wider context of the theological and philosophical debates of the time in question. But also earlier, of the 14th century, going back to the 11th century, and also including the classical period. The question of the real subsistence of the energies of God, the «ἐνέργειαι τοῦ Θεοῦ», the characteristics of God, the idiomata or «ἰδιώματα τοῦ Θεοῦ», or of the general ideas of God, «ἰδέαι τοῦ Θεοῦ», as it is termed in philosophical parlance. That is, when we speak of the “goodness of God”, when we say that God is “good”, what is this “goodness”? Is goodness a subsistence, something which really exists, or is it simply a word, a term and nothing more? When we say that so-and-so is a man, what do we mean by this term, “man”? Does it have “real” existence? Of course, we know that Peter, James and John are all individuals – all well and good. But “man”, does this have a real subsistence, or not? And so we have what is known as the problem of Nominalism and Realism. Nominalism would be the case if the characteristics and General Concepts or ideas were simply words and nothing more. Realism would be the case if these characteristics had real existence of their own – «πραγματικὴ ὑπόστασις», real existence, subsistence. This question was discussed not only in ancient times, but was especially prominent in the debates of the Middle Ages in the West. Realia refers to “those things which exist” – we could translate that as “those beings that exist”. Those things which exist, realia. Nominalia, refers to “those things which are named”. Res means “thing”, and nomen means “name”. These General Concepts then, in Latin, are called “universals”, universalia.
04:45
But before we go any further with this, I wish to bring to your attention an interesting passage from a theological debate, which took place in the middle of the 14th century between St Gregory Palamas and Nicephorus Gregoras; in the famous Council of Constantinople in 1351 (and we have a summary made by Fakrasi, the «Ἐπίτομος διήγησις τοῦ Φακρασῆ», the debate against Gregoras in the Abridged Account of Fakrasi), which was the third and final Council of the Hesychast Controversy, in which St Gregory took part, defending the Orthodox faith against probably the greatest philosopher of his time, Nicephorus Gregoras. So St Gregory, in this debate, asked Gregoras whether he believed the terms “immutable”, “infinity”, and “without beginning”, to be properties or qualities which God possesses “by nature”: «τὸ ἄτρεπτον, τὸ ἄπειρον, τὸ ἄναρχον, φυσικῶς ἔχει ὁ Θεός;» Does He have these qualities by nature? St Gregory asks. And to this question, Gregoras replied in the affirmative, «Ναί», he said, «οὐ τὸ ἄτρεπτον μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον - “Not only does He have the immutable, but also He is without end”. Yes, God possesses these qualities by nature, says Gregoras.
06:40
But he quickly adds that these are merely names and nothing more: «ἀλλὰ ταῦτα» (“these things”), «ὀνόματά ἐστι» (“are names”), «μόνον» (“only”), «καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο» (and nothing more). They are just names. They're not different things in God, or the ideas of real things in God. They're not essential properties of God - is what Gregoras is saying. They are simply names and nothing more. So St Gregory replies: “All right, God possesses these by nature, very good” - St Gregory takes that point and tries to build on that - “But these names, are they really simply names and nothing more? When we say that God is ‘without beginning’ and ‘without end’, and other such things, are these simply names and nothing more? Or do they describe things that are, things that really exist? Of course they are names of properties which are”, says St Gregory, “that do exist in reality in God.”
08:12
And Palamas continues: “If, again, they were simply thoughts in our minds, would they be true or false?” And Gregoras refused to answer. «Ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος», it says, «οὐκ ἐδίδου λόγον» (“And the philosopher did not give a word” - he didn't reply). So it's clear from this exchange between Palamas and Gregoras that Gregoras may be described as a Nominalist, while Palamas may be seen as being closer to the Realist position – even though, in actual fact, Palamas is neither a Realist, as we shall see later.
09:00
Now, be careful when you use these words, because today, when someone says that he is a Realist, it usually means that he is one who is a naturalist: one who believes only those things which are revealed to him through the senses - I only believe in what I see, what I hear, what I perceive through my senses. But when we use this term Realist in philosophy and theology, we mean the exact opposite: Ideas, Forms, Concepts are real; while the things of this world are merely shadows of the ideas. Now let's trace the development of this question back to the ancient world. This whole question begins with the two magnetic poles of world knowledge who, up to the present day, have never been surpassed: Plato and his greatest disciple, but also his greatest critic, Aristotle.
10:15
Plato had an interesting development in his philosophical speculations, and scholars generally draw a distinction between the younger, the Young Plato and the Older Plato. During his early years, on the question of ideas, this great philosopher emphasizes that the essence of reality, the essence of beings, is to be found in the Forms or Ideas, which are the eternal prototypes on the basis of which the given objects of this world have been realized. What are these Ideas, then? They are the Prototypes, the Archetypes, the Models and Patterns of things. The Idea of man, “Man”, with a capital “M”, is a reality, and on the basis of this Prototype, “Man”, which exists in another world, individual men were made, such as we find in this world: Peter, James, John and so forth. And the Prototype exists apart and outside of all these individuals. And, as you are aware, not just Man but each and every thing has its own prototype, including such concepts as “Goodness”, “Beauty”, and so on. This, then, is how the early, the Younger Plato understood and explained the phenomenon of multiplicity in the world of change. But the Older Plato, in his later Dialogues, says that Ideas are Prototypes, but he presents them as a form of numbers. (Remember, Plato was first and foremost a mathematician.) In other words, as infinite numbers, not imaginable as the Idea or the mold of the perfect man, but as a mold of numbers.
12:40
Today we can understand perhaps a little better the Older Plato's perception because of our mechanical and technological age, with computers etc. So think of it perhaps along the lines of numbers making up all these Ideas, the content of an electronic brain, a computer, doesn't actually contain anything in reality, but which is in fact programmed, and only in this way are we able to understand the thought of Plato in his second period, the period of his old age. We have the Prototypes comprised of infinite numbers, which exist but also do not exist, just as in a computer, which appears to contain nothing, but out of which not only hundreds and thousands but millions of things can appear. This is perhaps a handle that we have an advantage on in seeing the Older Plato's understanding of the Forms and the Ideas. In any case, that is basically the Platonic view of “Realia”, the things that exist.
14:14
Now, what about Aristotle? Both the Younger Plato and the Older Plato thought of the Forms as existing independent of things. “Man”, in other words, whether as a number or as a prototype, is to be found outside each individual being and all of those Ideas make up the world of Forms or Ideas, outside the things of this world. Aristotle comes along and says no to all of this. The Ideas are in things. “Man” is not independent of each individual man in the world, but exists - is in - Maximus, James, in me, and so on. “Man”, “manhood”, is in each individual.
15:17
Aristotle says that everything is made up of, or consists in, two elements - “matter”, or the “stuff” out of which things are made, and “form”. Everything, then, is said to be when it has these two elements, matter and form. In other words, matter which has no form, has no existence. “Uninformed” matter is simply the “stuff out of which things that exist are made”. St Gregory Palamas emphasizes very often that “there is no essence without energy”, «οὐσία ἀνενέργητος»: “an essence without energy does not exist”; there is no such thing as an essence which has no energy or action. While Aristotle says there is no such thing as formless matter, that such a thing does not exist. «ὕλη ἀδιαμόρφωτη», “matter that is uninformed” - formless matter - “does not exist”.
16:41
And of course there were other philosophers who also had something to say on the subject, but for the purpose of our study, we shall stop and look briefly at two of the most important of them. First, we're going to say something about Porphyry, Plotinus' friend, the Neoplatonist, because Neoplatonism comes after Aristotle's critique of Platonism and is influenced by it. And then we have Boethius later on, who gives us really the terminology that became common in the West vis-a-vis these questions - the question of ῾being῾ and ῾knowledge of being῾. So Porphyry, then. Porphyry asks three questions which influence the whole course of the history of philosophy: Whether the General Concepts or the General Principles (he doesn't use the same language as Plato) have a real subsistence, or are they merely thoughts in the mind of man? - Question number one. Question number two, if they do possess real subsistence, are they corporeal or incorporeal? And thirdly, whether corporeal or incorporeal, are they separate from the objects of sense, or in them? - So are we going towards Plato, or are we going towards Aristotle? Are they autonomous or in the objects themselves?
18:34
Now Boethius comes along and gives us the first principles of Scholasticism, of Scholastic philosophy, which develop principally from the 11th century onwards. It's Boethius, then, who calls the General Concepts - the Ideas - universalia, “universals”, the “generalities”, the Ideas. And he asks are these universals real, or names: res, realia or nomina? And here we find the terms realismus and nominalismus. And so from Boethius we have all the Latin terms which reappear mainly in the 11th century and earlier, and the debate on the question of universals played a significant role in the development in the West of scholastic philosophy and theology. So three schools appear in the West.
19:52
First you have the Realist School, realismus, in which the abstract General Concepts have an independent and separate existence from the individual things which express them. For example, “Man” as a universal is something which exists apart from the individual man. The General Concept of “Man” is incorporated in individual men, but has a separate and independent existence of its own. Western Scholastic theologians called this universalia ante res, so universals come before the things, which means “Ideas before things”. First, then come the General Concepts, the universals or Ideas, and then come the things which we find in the world, which come out of the molds called universals, and this is clearly Platonic. The philosophers who are of this School include, around the 9th century, John Scotus Erigena and later, in the 11th century mainly, Anselm of Canterbury.
Secondly, we have the Nominalist School.
21:30
Nominalismus, the direct opposite to the Realist School, and according to which the General Concepts are shadows and nothing more. They are mere words and do not correspond to the things which we perceive. Here the universals are seen as being out of things, foreign to the things, and bear no relation to them. If we take again the example of man, the nominalist would say that only individuals exist, and men, in order to communicate amongst themselves, say that these individuals are men, and that the General Concept has no subsistence of its own. Nominalism, then, was developed in the 11th century by Roscellinus, and later in the 14th century, the period which concerns us, by William of Occam. I mentioned him before.
22:39
Then we have, thirdly, the Moderate Realist School. Moderate Realism, then, as Professor Chrestou calls this. Professor Chrestou invents the term «ἐμπραγματοκρατεῖα», en-Realismus, because this School maintains that the General Concepts, the universals, do exist in reality. However, they do not exist separately and outside things, but only in things, and here we have Aristotle. This view is developed, of course, by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century and most of the Scholastic theologians. Here, universals are viewed as being in rebus, in things.
23:39
The question of Nominalism versus Realism was discussed by philosophers of the West concerning the ontology of universals, but did not limit the discussion to God, but generally to “first principles”. In Constantinople in the 14th century we observe the same thing, the same kind of debate taking place, but limited and focused solely on God; a discussion that involves Realism and Nominalism in the specific context of theology. And this is a subject to which relatively little attention has been given in the debates between Palamas and his opponents, and later. In such passages as the one referred to earlier, from the Abridged Record of Fakrasi, we have this, we see this dynamic. Gregoras does not restrict himself to the debates presented in Fakrasi's Abridged Record, but wrote an Antirrhetic work (of refutations) against the Hesychasts, and especially against Palamas. And those Refutations are published in the critical edition of Gregoras' works by Hans-Veit Bayer, who in his dedication exalts Barlaam, Akindynus and Gregoras, and pronounces, in Greek, «αἰωνία ἡ μνήμη», “memory eternal”, which is a very clear indication, of course, of where Hans-Veit Bayer exists. Volume 1, 1976, in an edition, a text from the 14th century, you can find Hans-Veit Bayer's critical edition of the Refutations of Gregoras. Now, in one of these Orations or Refutations, where Gregoras gives his version of things and in which he's often found to be “economical” with the truth, he nevertheless presents the questions under discussion at the time of his debates with Palamas.
26:06
He says, “There is no name that does not come after” - “that does not follow after”, literally - “the divine nature”. “There is no name that does not follow after the divine nature.” «Οὐδὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ δεύτερον ἐστὶν τῆς θείας οὐσίας [read: φύσεως] - “that is not second”, literally, “to the divine nature”. We mustn't ascribe importance to names. “Names are nothing”, he says. We mustn't ascribe importance to names because names describe in a certain sense the boundaries of the divine nature, but the divine nature itself is indescribable, and names are but shadows of it, to which we ought not to attach much importance. Therefore, we should not accept Palamas' theory of God's energies as existent realities.
27:17
And in order to support his view further, Gregoras appeals to St Gregory of Nyssa. St Gregory, bishop of Nyssa, «περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀνομάτων οὕτω φησίν…» (“concerning these names, it says the following: If the essence pre-exists the energies, why should we not say that names are newer” - “younger” - “and that they come after existent things?” Well, Gregoras uses this passage and continues by saying that all of this is used to demonstrate that names follow after the nature of God and therefore we do not have what we saw in Plato - “Realism”, nomina ante res, “names before the thing”. Gregoras' mistake, because he was a nominalist on these questions, is that he wanted to apply his theory of nominalism to the old theologians. The nominalists of both the 11th and the 14th centuries argued that the “characteristics of God” - we would say, the “divine energies” - do not exist in reality. They are simply words and nothing more. This is what Gregoras himself believed, and in his reading of St Gregory of Nyssa he wanted to believe that St Gregory [of Nyssa] was also a supporter of his theory.
29:06
But when St Gregory of Nyssa says “names”, he doesn't mean the “energies”, he means “the names of the energies”. These names, the names of the energies - the “goodness of God”, the “divine light”, “God's creativity” - all such names were given later by men. But Nyssa does not say that the energies themselves are names, and nothing more. Also, when St Gregory of Nyssa says that the divine essence exists prior to the divine energies, he does not mean that the divine essence is completely independent of the energies, and [that] later, as God operates, we give names to God's energies, which do in fact exist, but are simply manifestations of God's essence. This is Gregoras' understanding, but Nyssa does not say this. And Palamas emphasizes that no chronological dimension exists in God.
30:25
So he explains that when Nyssa says, “pre-exists” and refers to the energies as “newer” and “older” - to aspects of God which are newer and older - this does not signify that they are so in terms of time. In terms of time, there's no chronological dimension in God. This is a matter of order, taxis, and Palamas says, “I myself stress that the divine energies follow after the essence”. Palamas doesn't disagree on this point. But this does not mean that the essence of God chronologically exists before or prior to his energies, and that his energies come into being later. They exist simultaneously. But this is a case of causality and order. How does the one come from, or issue forth from, the other? The energies come from the essence of God by cause, «αἰτιολογικῶς», “by cause”, and not chronologically in time. And so what we have here is “cause”, «αἴτιον», and “that which is caused”, «αἰτιατόν», and in this way Palamas successfully counters Gregoras' argument.
32:15
But the nominalism of Gregoras is refuted more exhaustively later, in somewhat greater detail, by another great Hesychast theologian, St Philotheus Kokkinos, whom we have already referred to as Patriarch of Constantinople, as a disciple of St Gregory, and as Palamas’ biographer - one of two, the other being St Nilus - and Kokkinos also composed a service to St Gregory. Kokkinos wrote a large number of works, including Refutations Against Gregoras, and in Refutation IX, he says, «φασί τινες φύσεως εἶναι σημαντικὴν τὴν Θεότητα. ἡμεῖς δὲ φάμεν ὅτι ὄνομα σημαντικὸν ἡ θεία φύσις». What this means is that the term «Θεότης» - we mentioned this before, “Godhead” or “divinity” - is presented by the Hesychasts as not always equivalent to the word «Θεός», “God”; and they present «Θεότης» as the basic energy of God. “Divinity” most often refers to the energetic aspect of God. It is God Himself, but not God in His essence [it is] God in His energetic aspect, and therefore the name «Θεότης» does not describe the divine essence - it describes the energy of God. Consequently, the names that we employ, says St Philotheus, describe the energies of God and not His essence. But he also adds that there is no cause for concern here for those who say that the divine essence is indescribable, uncircumscribed, which is what the Fathers before taught, such as St Gregory of Nyssa, because no attempt is being made to describe the essence of God. What is being described, in fact, is that aspect of God which the Hesychasts characterize as energies, divinity, God's justice, God's creativity, and the rest. The Hesychasts present God as having a “twofoldness”, two aspects. Palamas himself uses the word, «διπλόη» - «ἡ διπλόη τῆς οὐσίας». It's a very rarely used term and Professor Chrestou explains - he likes to explain this by using the analogy of the two sides of a coin. I use the analogy of the moon with its dark side, which is hid from us; on the one side, we have the divine essence and on the other, we have the energy of God, or His energies in the plural. Now, in accordance with Palamas' teaching on the energies of God as essential realities of God, we also have a real knowledge of God.
36:18
The anti-Hesychasts, who were humanists and rationalists, and many of whom, not all, but many of them were nominalists, wanted to separate the problems relating to faith from those relating to epistemology - the problem of knowledge more generally. So for them God is the object of faith: that's all right [sc. for them], and we should simply leave it there. But we [sc. the anti-Hesychasts] cannot say, therefore, that we have a knowledge of God, because the human mind is limited and can only go so far, and no further, and so cannot know the Godhead fully, only in part. And how can this knowledge be accomplished?
37:16
By means of God's «ἐνεργήματα», say the anti-Hesychasts, not by His energies, but by means of the visible created things of nature, through God's creation. This is an analogical ascent to the knowledge of God, but not a real one. In other words, looking for the analogies, the similarities, that are to be found in the created order, so as to come to a knowledge of God Himself, which nevertheless remains partial, limited, because they believed that God is pure essence, and only essence, and that the divine essence is indescribable. Well, Palamas and the Hesychasts, on the other hand, insisted - and I'll finish with this - that we can know God fully. Fully in the sense that we may come to know, in the context of the twofoldness of the divine reality, the one aspect of God himself, but not the other. Which aspect? The energies of God. But the energies of God are God Himself. It's not God holding back. Remember, knowledge is participation, and participation means “identity with”. We cannot be God Himself. It's as simple as that. Therefore, that aspect which is revealed to us is the “life” of God, the “energies” of God, the “divinity”.
39:16
In a passage that comes from the debate between Palamas and Gregoras, we have an important account of the Hesychast teaching. I'll read it in English: “That [with regard to God], one aspect of God is unknowable and one aspect is known. One aspect is inexpressible and the other may be expressed: God is unknown with respect to his nature, but known from the natural energies that surround Him.” Again, of course, people have been misinterpreting these passages for a long time, especially coming from the perspective of Western, post-Augustinian, Scholastic philosophy, theology, and so forth.
40:15
But “the energies that surround Him” does not mean angelic powers or some other force. It's referring to God Himself. It's that aspect that is known, that aspect that can be expressed, that aspect of God Himself. But the language is designed to prevent us from trying to comprehend the essence of God. The conclusion to the debate between Palamas and Gregoras, on the question of whether the energies of God are existent realities or merely names, is precisely this: the twofoldness of the divine nature, and the twofoldness of man's knowledge with regard to the divine nature. And so we have the divine nature, but the divine nature has two aspects, as we've said. With regard to the one aspect, God is unknowable. With regard to the other, He is fully knowable. And this knowledge is understood in terms of participation in the very life of God Himself, by grace, that is to say, as pure gift.